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Abstract—IoT devices have been adopted widely in the last
decade which enabled collection of various data from different
environments. The collected data is crucial in certain applications
where IoT devices generate data for critical infrastructure or
systems whose failure may result in catastrophic results. Specifi-
cally, for such critical applications, data storage poses challenges
since the data may be compromised during the storage and
the integrity might be violated without being noticed. In such
cases, integrity and data provenance are required in order to be
able to detect the source of any incident and prove it in legal
cases if there is a dispute with the involved parties. To address
these issues, blockchain provides excellent opportunities since it
can protect the integrity of the data thanks to its distributed
structure. However, it comes with certain costs as storing huge
amount of data in a public blockchain will come with significant
transaction fees. In this paper, we propose a highly cost effective
and reliable digital forensics framework by exploiting multiple
inexpensive blockchain networks as a temporary storage before
the data is committed to Ethereum. To reduce Ethereum costs,
we utilize Merkle trees which hierarchically stores hashes of the
collected event data from IoT devices. We evaluated the approach
on popular blockchains such as EOS, Stellar, and Ethereum by
presenting a cost and security analysis. The results indicate that
we can achieve significant cost savings without compromising the
integrity of the data.
Index Terms—Data Integrity; Blockchain; IoT device; digital
forensics; Ethereum
I. INTRODUCTION
The advancement in communication technologies, sensing
items, and affordable computing devices has led us to the age
of internet of things (IoT) which enables collecting diverse
ambient data and communicate it to remote locations [1]. IoT
is becoming the de facto technology in many domains includ-
ing transportation, energy, healthcare, agriculture, hospitality,
etc. [2]. In these applications, the data collected from various
IoT devices are used to conduct extensive analytics to make in-
formed decisions and take actions. In some scenarios, however,
the data is very crucial to run critical infrastructure (i.e., power
systems, transportation) and understand failures when they
occur. In particular, if there are failures due to human errors or
deliberate attacks, it is utmost important to be able to detect the
cause of these failures and hold involved parties responsible.
Therefore, the secure transmission and storage of IoT data is
critical for such purposes [20]. This necessitates mechanisms
to be able to store IoT data for digital forensics investigation
purposes. As the data needs to be presented as evidence in case
of disputes, there is a need for trustworthy storage which can-
not be deleted or modified. Emerging Blockchain technology
can be an excellent fit for such scenarios since it can provide
authenticity verification, data provenance, and data integrity
[3]. It comes with a distributed ledger technology which can
run consensus algorithm among peers to enable transactions in
trustless environments. This eliminates the need for a central
authority and thus provide a distributed trust. Indeed, with
such features Blockchain technology [6] has opened doors to
many novel applications in various domains [7]. Among these,
forensic investigations, healthcare, insurance business etc. [3]
are of interest since there is a need to prove that the stored
data has not been tampered with after it was saved.
As a more specific example, let us consider rental businesses
and insurance industry which can rent cars or boats. When
a person rents a vehicle or any other asset, a dispute might
occur among the stake-holders in case of an accident, failure
or illegal usage. The renter must operate the vehicle by
complying with the regulations, and an insurance company
may want to ensure that they are covering only what they are
responsible for. The insurance companies have to deal with
fraudulent claims valued at millions of dollars every week [4].
The company must validate if the preconditions of the policy
are met. In order to establish a ground where everyone is held
accountable fairly, the data generated by sensors/IoT devices
must be recorded timely, stored transparently and securely. We
argue that blockchain technology can address this issue [8].
Specifically, an ideal solution would be creating a permis-
sioned blockchain (i.e. a private blockchain network) which
allows only certain entities to join the network where some
untrusted parties can exchange information. Stakeholder such
as users, rental company, renter, and insurance company can
become part of this private blockchain network. However,
this approach brings alot of overhead in terms of managing
the private ledger. Thus, the stakeholders would not be not
cooperative in this respect. In addition, the security of a private
blockchain depends on the number of users and small ones
could be risky in terms of consensus. Thus, it makes more
sense to use a public blockchain to eliminate the management
overhead and increase trust.
However, in the case of public blockchain, there is the
challenge of costs with transactions. This is particularly the
case with popular blockchain networks such as Ethereum or
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Bitcoin. If huge amounts of data is to be written to these
public ledgers, this may annually cost a lot of money even for
Ethereum which is much affordable compared to Bitcoin [5].
In addition, the solution would not be scalable as the number
of IoT devices writing to blockchain increases dramatically.
While it is possible to use other less costly ledger platforms
instead of Ethereum, their reliability will be much less since
these ledgers may not have enough nodes and thus 51% attack
may be performed with less effort. Therefore, there is a need
for cost-effective mechanisms to store IoT data in public
blockchains.
In this paper, we design and evaluate a forensics framework
for IoT data integrity verification by proposing a multi-
chain approach where we utilize multiple relatively afford-
able blockchain networks such as EOS [22] and Stellar [12]
(compared to Ethereum and Bitcoin) for temporarily storing
the hash of the IoT data before they are permanently stored
to Ethereum. To reduce the hash sizes further, we propose to
utilize Merkle trees that can represent a number of hashes in
a single hash value stored in a tree-like structure. The overall
idea is creating a secure platform with the combination of
several blockchains which makes it more powerful than the
sum of each individual.
Specifically, as the data collected from an IoT device during
predefined events, it is transferred to company database. Then,
the hash of that data is stored in EOS and Stellar blockchain
ledgers which serves as the first security level in our proposed
framework. At the end of each day, the IoT device retrieves the
block information from these two platforms and inserts them in
a Merkle tree whose roots are written to Ethereum as a second
level security platform. The advantages of this approach are
twofold: First, it is cost-efficient because we are saving the
incident information mostly in EOS and Stellar, which are
much cheaper and only daily summary of all transactions is
written to Ethereum. Second, the proposed framework has
higher security and resiliency against %51 consensus attack
[9]. The attacker must hack both blockchain networks in the
first level within the same day before the summary is written
to Ethereum, or s/he has to change data both in Ethereum
and one of the blockchains in the first level. Their consensus
algorithms make it even more difficult to launch an attack.
Note that the number of blockchains in the first level can be
increased to further strengthen the security of the system. We
showed through a cost analysis that the proposed framework
can reduce the costs by more than 10 folds of magnitude.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next section,
we summarize the related work in the literature. Section III
provides some background on the used concepts. Section IV
presents the system and threat model while Section V details
the proposed scheme. In Section VI, we present a cost and
security analysis of the proposed mechanism. Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Various ideas have been proposed related to blockchain
utilization for data integrity verification. The works done by
[18], [19] focus on generic blockchain-based data provenance
infrastructure for IoT generated data. They first identify the
security and trust related challenges, and then disscuss how
blockchain can be included to overcome these issues. Authors
in [14] suggest a framework for car accident scenarios which
supposed to save data in blockchain when an accident happens.
They use a simplified public key infrastructure tailored for
vehicular networks to preserve the privacy. The data saved in
blockchain is used to solve any dispute among the insurer,
owner and manufacturer. Gipp et al. [16] implemented a
similar approach on smartphones which is used as dashboard
camera in cars. Once smartphone detects an accident via ac-
celerometer sensor, it starts recording the scene and calculates
the hash at the end to be written to the public blockchain. In
order to keep the cost to minimum, it stores the aggregation
of the hashes. In order to prove that the video stored on the
phone has not been changed, the user can provide the original
video with the hash. Block-DEF [15] is proposing a secure
digital evidence framework using blockchain. The idea is to
store evidence and evidence information separately. In order to
avoid data bloat, they are proposing a lightweight blockchain
design. They claim that it is a scalable framework to keep the
evidence safe and tamper-proof. ProvChain [17] try to provide
data assurance for the collected data through IoT sensors. They
calculate the hash of the data and store it on the blockchain
network instead of the whole data. Our work differs from
previous works in two ways: First, in addition to hash-based
storage we utilize Merkle trees to further save space. Secondly,
and more important, we use multiple low-cost blockchain
networks collaboratively to increase the reliability/security
while keeping the cost lower.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some background on the concepts
used in our approach.
A. Blockchain
Blockchain is a list of records called blocks, first proposed
by Satoshi for Bitcoin [6] which became popular quickly in
the world. The aim is providing decentralized trust. Blockchain
technology is a combination of various technologies such as
cryptographic hash algorithms, peer-to-peer (P2P) distributed
network data sharing, digital signatures, and Proof of Work
(PoW) consensus protocol. Cryptographic hash algorithms
provide us data integrity and Blockchain uses this feature
to bind chains together by their hash values as hown in
Fig. 1. P2P distributed network model provides decentralized
communication among nodes. With digital signatures, nodes
can manage their assets and prove their possession without
relying on a central authority. PoW consensus protocol is the
main innovation of Blockchain technology which guarantees
randomness and decentralized reward election.
Note that blockchain can be used to implement tamper-
resistant data storage. Once a data is deployed into the
blockchain, it is almost impossible to change this data in large-
size blockchain networks such as Bitcoin and Ethereum. These
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networks have thousands of nodes (115,000 for Ethereum and
100,000 for Bitcoin) for storing data into their own ledgers.
If any malicious person wants to change the data in these
ledgers, s/he must change at least 51% of the nodes. This
attack is referred to as 51% attack in the rest of the paper.
This feature provides a high level of data integrity.
Fig. 1: Blockchain
B. Ethereum
Ethereum [10] is the most widely used and trustable Smart
Contract oriented Blockchain network in the world. It is a pub-
lic, permissionless blockchain which means that anyone can
access the information on Ethereum and initiate transactions
on their own. It was built as a platform for people to develop
decentralized applications easily. Instead of storing monetary
transactions in the blocks, one can store smart contracts, or
code snippets, in the blocks as seen in Fig. 2. Ethereum uses
solidity programming language for creating contract which is
compiled by Ethereum virtual machine. Every contract has a
gas fee that is calculated based on the contracts memory space
and total workloads. It becomes more expensive when the
data size gets bigger. Ethereum currently uses PoW consensus
algorithm like Bitcoin but Ethereum’s block frequency is
between 10-20 seconds since its hash puzzles are much easier
to solve. Thus, Ethereum generates blocks faster and has
higher throughput.
Metamask Send Data to 
Miner node
Miner Node
Other EVM Nodes
Other EVM Nodes
Other EVM Nodes
Fig. 2: Ethereum Smart Contract Distribution
C. Stellar
Stellar [12] was the first smart contract oriented blockchain
network which aims to provide a scalable payment gateway
for users. Stellar is very scalable as its block/contract mining
time is around 3-5 seconds. It can confirm thousands of
transactions per second. Stellar uses gossip network-based
voting algorithm, named Stellar Consensus Algorithm, for con-
sensus in the blockchain network. The development team also
provides a wide range of API/SDK to make better development
in Stellar blockchain. Finally, multi-signature enabled smart
contracts are beneficial for multi-user applications. Lumen is
used as a cryptocurrency in Stellar blockchain network. Due
to Lumen’s low currency exchange rate, the contract creation
and deployment fees are so low making Stellar an affordable
blockhain option.
D. EOS
EOS [22] is a well-known and efficient Blockchain Net-
work. Its name comes from Ethereum Operating System.
EOS uses delegated proof of stake as a consensus protocol
that provides high efficiency and low energy consumption.
Deploying smart contract to EOS network is easy and free but
the contract creator should hold some amount of EOS, CPU,
and RAM to use EOS bandwidth efficiently. One central EOS
full node is enough for multiple wallets.
E. Smart Contract
Smart contracts are pieces of code that are executed by
virtual machines which are run in all full blockchain nodes in
the network. These Virtual machines are generally compilers
which collaborate with the public ledger of the node. When
the contract creator deploys a smart contract, the metadata of
this smart contract is broadcast to all nodes in the network
and becomes un-erasable. The way these smart contracts can
be used varies based on the platform. Smart contracts can be
utilized to implement various use cases by eliminating third
parties. For instance, people can exchange any asset such as
a vehicle without involving the government authority since
they can prove the ownership of this vehicle by using the
records on the distributed ledger. Other use cases include rule-
based transactions which are achieved using some if and else
statements in these contracts. Smart contract concept has great
to potential to ease some daily operations though governments
do not have any regulation yet for smart contract uses.
F. Merkle Tree
Merkle tree [13] is a fundamental data structure that allows
effective and reliable verification of content in a huge collec-
tion of data. This structure serves to check the consistency
and content of the data. Basically, a Merkle tree compiles all
the data in a tree by producing a digital fingerprint of the
entire set, thereby allowing any actor to verify whether or not
a specific node is included in the tree.
Merkle trees are formed by repeatedly hashing nodes until
there is only one hash left, which is called Merkle Root as seen
Fig 3. The hashing is conducted from the bottom up, starting
from hashes of individual data points. Specifically, each leaf
node in the tree is a different hash of data point, and each
non-leaf node is a hash of its two separate roots of its sub-
trees. Merkle tree is actually a perfect binary tree structure
which requires an even number of leaf nodes. Thus, when the
number of individual data points is odd, simply the last data
point is duplicated to produce an even number of leaf nodes.
One of the essential differences of a Merkle tree from a
basic hash-list is that branches can be fetched independently.
As a result, the integrity of each branch can be verified
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Fig. 3: Merkle Tree
independently. This is beneficial because records can be split
up into small data chunks such that only a small piece needs
to be fetched to verify the integrity of any leaf node. This
process is called simplified verification (SV) and proves that
particular transactions are included in a Merkle tree without
downloading the entire tree.
As an example consider SV of Tran.#4 in the Merkle tree
given in Fig. 3. If a verifier wants to check whether Tran.#4 is
included in the Merkle tree, it just needs to fetch the shaded
hash values in the tree (i.e., Hash#1-2 and Hash#3). Using
these hash values, s/he can re-compute his/her Merkle root
and compare with the the given Merkle root. Specifically, the
process works as follows:
1) The verifier aggregates Hash#3 (given) and hash(Tran#4)
which is available to derive Hash#4.
2) The verifier aggregates the given Merkle path node,
Hash#1-2 and Hash#4 to derive Hash#3-4.
3) The verifier aggregates Hash#3-4 with the given Hash#1-
2 to derive the Merkle root.
4) The obtained Merkle root is compared with the given
Merkle root. If they match, the verification is complete.
Consequently, the Merkle tree significantly reduces the
amount of data in a verification process. It provides a unique
mechanism to provide a validation process without requiring
the whole data itself. For instance, to prove that a continuously
growing transaction log is complete and intact, the Merkle
tree provides a lightweight verification method which includes
all previous transactions. The verification ensures no previous
transactions have been altered, and the tree has never been
branched. Because of this unique verification, Merkle tree
benefits both provers and verifiers. A prover can compute
hashes progressively, as it collects new transactions. A verifier
can verify a transaction individually by checking individual
hashes of other branches of the tree.
IV. SYSTEM AND THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we consider a boat rental application, which is
very common in South Florida. Basically, boats are rented by a
boat rental company and their data are collected via on-board
sensors. Each boat is equipped with an on-board IoT edge
device that can communicate with various sensors within the
boat using CAN bus protocol. All the sensor data may not
be equally significant for the rental company though. Thus,
it is not required to write all of them to blockchain or even
to database. The data is filtered out based on significance or
certain events. For instance, the renters are allowed to drive
within a specific zone for which the insurance is valid. So, it
may not be necessary to transmit the geolocation constantly,
but if an accident happens or when the boat goes outside
of designated area, the data becomes important. When the
system decides that a data is important, then it is transmitted
to a remote company database by the edge device through the
widely used MQTT protocol [21] and 4G/LTE communication.
A sample system model is shown in Fig. 4.
IoT Edge Device
IoT Edge Device
IoT Edge Device
Company central Database
MQTT Protocol MQTT Protocol
MQTT Protocol
Fig. 4: System Model
The security of the proposed forensic framework depends
on the secure implementation of proposed multi-chain system.
Therefore, we consider the following threats to the security
of the proposed approach and identified the relevant security
goals. Note that in our attack model, we assume that IoT edge
device is tamper-proof through Hardware Security Modules
(HSMs) that provide device-level controls to protect deployed
IoT devices. Therefore, IoT edge device infiltration is out of
scope.
Threat 1: In this scenario, the attacker disguises itself as
an IoT edge device for pushing false IoT data into our multi-
chain system by inferring the private keys that are used to sign
the data.
Threat 2: In mining-based consensus protocols, all the
data is kept in the memory pools (mempools) and miners
choose transactions from this memory area. In other words,
the mempool is basically the nodes waiting room for all the
unconfirmed transactions. Each blockchain node has a differ-
ent mempool size for stocking the transactions. Thus, each
node has a different version of the pending transactions. This
creates a variety of pending transactions on different nodes in
a distributed manner. If the size of unconfirmed transactions
becomes too large to fit in memory, the miners independently
remove some of the pending transactions from their mempool.
To do so, miners generally remove the transactions which pays
less transaction fees to boost their earning from mining. In
Part of this paper will be presented in IEEE ICBC, 2020, Toronto
Raw Data
Decide
significant
data
Store in
Database D1, D2, ... Dn
EOS
Stellar
H(D1), H(D2) ... H(Dn)
H(D1), H(D2) ... H(Dn)
Ethereum
Retrieve block
information R1, R2, R3
Put hashes in
Merkle tree
Fig. 5: Proposed System Design
this scenario, the attacker attacks the mempool and get the
transactions which have the hash values to be removed or
delayed.
Threat 3: In this attack scenario, the attacker attacks the
IoT device communication layer and performs a man-in-the-
middle (MitM) attack for altering the transactions.
Threat 4: In this attack scenario, the attacker can counterfeit
data in the Ethereum Blockchain.
V. PROPOSED APPROACH
A. Motivations
In our case, we seek an efficient solution for a boat rental
company which aims to store sensor data collected from its
boats in a such a way that it can prove the integrity of data
in future retrievals. Note that a secure integrity mechanism
would not only reduce their insurance rates but also help them
in quickly resolving potential disputes with its customers.
There may be different options to tackle this issue by lever-
aging the blockchain technology. As mentioned, blockchain
is a promising environment to verify and prove the integrity
of prerecorded data. It has great potential specifically for
insurance industry since registering important data will be ben-
eficial in resolving disputes among stake-holders. Therefore,
the most obvious option would be to construct a permissioned
blockchain among stake-holders. This type of solution is
applicable when multiple untrusting parties want to share
information. For instance, raw material provider, manufacturer,
transporter, seller in a supply-chain link can create a consor-
tium for data provenance and integrity. IBM’s Hyperledger
[24] is designed for this type of business cases. For our specific
case, insurance companies are typically not cooperative due to
management costs which rules out this option. However, since
the rental company still wants to store data in an immutable
way, utilizing a public a blockchain could be an option.
Therefore, the second solution could be to write the data
directly to Ethereum network which is a highly secure
blockchain platform. It will be required to have stake worth
billions of dollar to make a 51% attack. However, writing
every single transaction on Ethereum will be highly costly
considering the number of transactions in IoT cases. Ethereum
might be feasible for some other cases such as asset transfer
utilizing smart contract. For instance, when the ownership
of car is transferred, the money transfer will be completed.
However, in cases where we need frequent transactions, it is
not a very cost-efficient method.
Another option would be that data is saved in the database
and the calculated hash of stored data is written to Ethereum
periodically (i.e., once a day). This will reduce the cost
significantly when compared to previous approach and ensure
the data integrity after it is written to blockchain. While this
reduces costs, it does not guarantee the data immutability for
the duration of data residing in the data center database. So,
this approach has issues with the security while the cost is
lower.
Therefore, we opt for a more cost-efficient approach that
will rely on multiple blockchain networks as detailed next.
B. Proposed Multi-chain Framework
One of the biggest challenges with traditional forensics
mechanisms is the need to maintain an additional trusted
authority to ensure the integrity of the data. Regardless of
being encrypted or not, if the trusted authority is compromised,
it provides an intruder with an origin to play with the integrity
of the data. In addition, a single trusted authority alone cannot
stand for an insider attack when it becomes a target of interest.
Our proposed framework, first, alleviates the trust issue
and establish a trustless setup by utilizing the blockchain
technology. However, storing data on public blockchain is both
expensive and has lots of privacy concerns. As mentioned,
even though the boat rental company can maintain only the
hash of the data in the blockchain to compare it with the actual
data on its database during forensic investigations, keeping just
the hash of IoT event data on a secure and public blockchain
still costs a lot of money in the long run as will be shown in
the Experiment section.
Therefore, we resort to affordable alternatives for public
blockchains. Although Bitcoin and Ethereum are most popular
and sustainable blockchain platforms, there are many others
such as Stellar and EOS, which have survived for years.
While they may not be as reliable as Bitcoin and Ethereum
because of the limited number of users and popularity, the cost
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Fig. 6: Integrity Verification Process
of using these platforms are significantly lower. Since using
only one of these platforms may not be secure, we propose
a multi-factor integrity (MFI) system that utilizes multiple
low-cost blockchain platforms together with Ethereum. The
idea is similar to using a back-up system against system
failures. We aim to increase the resiliency of data in case one
of the platforms will discontinue or hacked. MFI makes it
more difficult for a malicious actor to alter the IoT data in a
stealthy way, which is stored in the company’s database. If one
blockchain is compromised or broken, a malicious actor still
has at least one more obstacle to breach the integrity of the
data. Note that these platforms are all smart contract oriented
to enable easy communications among each other.
To reduce data size to be written to public blockchains, we
employ hash functions along with Merkle tree. Our approach
for reducing costs is as follows:
1) In the first step, the IoT edge device from a boat submits
the hash of IoT data to the first level of the multi-chain
system. As mentioned, only interesting data is picked
based on some predefined events or pre-conditions. The
hash of this data is written to both Stellar and EOS
during the day as long as there is inteersting data.
2) At the end of each day, a synchronization process starts
and the data center of the rental company fetches the
confirmed transactions which were submitted to the first
level blockchains Stellar and EOS. The data center then
builds a Merkle tree from confirmed transactions and
computes the Merkle root for each.
3) The Merkle root computed in the previous step repre-
sents another integrity factor. Thus, it is submitted to a
more secure and reliable blockchain, Ethereum, and a
copy of it is stored in local database to be used during
forensic investigations. Note that Ethereum is used only
for the hash of all hashes during a day to save transaction
costs.
The proposed overall architecture is shown in Figure 5.
C. Integrity Verification Process
When there is an incident that creates dispute on who is
responsible, the proposed framework will be used to find out
and prove what happened. Basically, a an insurance company
working on a claim or a law enforcement officer working on
an accident scene needs to ensure the integrity of the available
data. Once the integrity of the data is ensured, the faulty party
can be determined undeniably.
To do so, considering our framework, the investigator/officer
first accesses the related forensic data that is stored in the
data center. S/he will then need to collect the submitted
transactions that contain the hashed of the data to the first level
blockchains, related Merkle root values and Merkle paths of
those transactions.
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The details of the process is shown in Figure 6. In this
figure, the data center contains a row for each event data which
includes: 1) the original IoT data; 2) The transaction created
with the hash of this data; 3) The Merkle path nodes for this
data; and 4) The Merkle root.
Let us consider Transaction #1 (Tx1). This transaction
contains the hash of an event data that is already stored in the
data center. The investigator/officer can trust the event data if
it exists in the first level blockchain. Basically, the hash of the
event data is computed and this hash is compared with the
value in Tx1 in EOS and/or Stellar.
Then, the investigator/officer, can of course, choose to
validate the input transactions again on Ethereum. In order
to validate Tx1 and ensure that it exists within the Merkle
path, s/he needs to check whether the provided Merkle root
which contains the Tx1 and given Merkel root M1 is equal to
the value stored in Ethereum. To do so, s/he simply needs to
compute the hash of Tx1 that acts as a node in the Merkle
tree provided by the data center. With the given nodes in
its Merkle path, the investigator/officer can simply and very
quickly calculate M1 (i.e., the Merkle root of which Tx1
belongs to) by series of hash operations with SV method
as described in Section III. If the calculated Merkle root by
investigator is equal to the provided M1, s/he ensures that the
path in the Merkle tree is correct and Merkle root M1 contains
Tx1.
If the computed Merkle root and the value which is saved
in the Ethereum matches, the investigator/officer knows with
certainty that the data center has given him/her a valid/tamper-
proof IoT hash data. S/he also knows that the existence
of the transaction in the blockchain has been validated by
different multi-chain miners and that there is an extensive
PoW/computation time ensuring the integrity of the hash data
in the multi-chain system. The overall process of verification
is shown in Figure 6.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed framework in terms
of its associated costs.
A. Experiment Setup
To perform transactions in each of the mentioned blockchain
platforms, we created their respective nodes. First, we setup
EOS central node to which nodes are supposed to connect
through the EOS chain plugin API. Every node (boats in our
case) has its wallet and uses this wallet to connect to main
EOS Network. When there is any interesting event, IoT edge
device pushes the hash of this value into EOS Blockchain
via Central EOS Node. In this setup, it is possible for each
wallet to track all transactions easily via history api plugin.
Similarly, we installed Stellar wallets to connect to its network
using theirs APIs.
We use events waiting for API recalls to trigger smart
contracts which becomes ready to be deployed to Ethereum
after checking validity. Event is an interface between wallet,
API, and smart contracts. Javascript API connects to Web3
interface of Ethereum client that hosts smart contract, and
triggers the hash deployment event. Triggered function imports
the Merkle root data that we constructed, and creates a
transaction for Metamask wallet which is the most widely used
wallet by Ethereum developers. Metamask wallet broadcasts
metadata of the contract to all main Ethereum network via
peers, and wait for one miner to put the smart contract into a
block.
TABLE I: Transaction Cost
Blockchain Unit Cost Cost in $ Time
EOS 100 EOS (once) $0.00063 < 1 min
Stellar 0,001 Lumen $0.000054 < 1 min
Ethereum (contr) 0.000131 ETH $0,019 12 min
Ethereum 0.000025 ETH $0,0036 10 min
B. Benchmarks
We compared our approach with two other approaches as
described below:
• Ethereum with new Contract: This approach creates a new
Ethereum contract for each hash and insert the hash in
this contract. Note that creating a new contract for each
piece of data is costly but it is simple and most secure
way to store data in the Ethereum Blockchain.
• Function Call from Ethereum Contract: This approach
deploys an Ethereum contract by including a function,
and thus each time this function is called to save the hash
instead of creating a new contract. Making a function
call is a cheaper process than a new contract deployment
since the contract creator pays only the contract creation
fee once. However, when one smart contract is deployed
and its function is called to save a new hash value, it
becomes less secure. The attacker can directly attack a
particular contract instead of hundreds of them.
C. Cost Analysis
We assessed the cost associated with the proposed frame-
work by comparing it with the benchmarks mentioned. Before
doing the complete cost analysis, we measured and provided
the unit transaction costs associated with each blockchain
platform for a function call to save a hash value along with
the transaction verification time in Table I. We observe that
Ethereum unit price, even deployed with the minimum gas fee,
is much higher than others. It should also be noted that EOS
provides free contract deployment but it requires to have 100
EOS in the node. The other note is about the validatin times.
EOS and Stellar are much faster for real-time transactions.
Ethereum on the other hand is slow but since it is used at the
end of the day on already stored transactions, this would not
be of concern.
In doing the computations, we assumed that each boat sends
10 significant data every day throughout one year and there
are 1000 boats owned by the company. Table II lists the costs
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TABLE II: Multichain cost calculation
Blockchain Network # of boats Data point Total Cost in $
EOS 1000 10x365 $232
Stellar 1000 10x365 $197
Ethereum - 2x365 $14
Grand total $443
associated with our proposed approach. It basically lists the
costs relating to first level of blockchain (i.e., EOS and Stellar)
for 1000 boats. For Ethereum since only the summary of data
coming from EAS and Stellar is written, we have 2 per day
only. The toal cost for our approach comes to $443.
TABLE III: Cost Comparison
Aprroach Total Cost in $
Multichain (EOS + Stellar + Ethereum) $443
Ethereum only (func. call) $13140
Ethereum only (new contract) $69350
Table III lists the costs associated with other approaches
compared to ours. As can be seen, the cost of Ethereum only
approach is very expensive which is around $70K. While it is
highly secure and reliable, it will not be attractive for the boat
company to deploy. The other Ethereum aproach with function
calls turn out to be much affordable around $13K. This is
because, the contract deployment cost is a one-time cost and
the hashes are always written to this contract. Neverthless,
this is still much expensive compared to our cost of $443.
The savings with our approach is significant and can be very
attractive for the company to deploy.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we consider all the attacks mentioned in our
Threat Model in Section IV and analyze how our proposed
framework addresses these attacks.
Threat 1: In this scenario, the attacker tries to masquerade
IoT device for pushing bogus IoT data into our multi-chain
system. To do so, the attacker needs to derive the different
private keys of IoT edge device that are used in EOS, Stellar
and data center. We argue that even if the attacker may obtain
one or more of these keys, the attack can be thwarted due
to our MFI design. Any inconsistency between pushed data
can be easily detected by the data center with a simple check.
This means, the attacker needs to obtain all of the keys, which
is very unlikely. Note that, we opt-out the stolen private key
attack by assuming that HSM is deployed in IoT edge devices.
Threat 2: Considering mentioned mempool features, the
attacker may try to delete the transaction from the mempool.
However, it is almost impossible because transaction pool is
held by every node separately and the only way to delete these
transactions is to remove them from all nodes in the network
which means accomplishing a 51% attack continuously for all
blockchains in our multi-chain framework.
Another possibility is that the attacker can make too many
bogus transactions with higher transaction fees to force nodes
to remove the less paid transactions from their mempool. This
attack has three main drawbacks. First, the attacker should
invest huge amount of money to create enough bogus trans-
actions to fill the mempools of all nodes for each blockchain.
Second, this attack does not guarantee that only the related
transactions (i.e., the ones whch hold the IoT hash values)
will be removed from the mempool. Third, IoT device or data
center can redo transactions if it is not confirmed within a
reasonable time period.
Threat 3: In this attack scenario, the attacker may perform
MitM attack between Blockchain peers and IoT edge devices.
If the attack is successful, that means for both of the two mid-
size Blockchain networks (i.e., EOS and Stellar), the attacker
can block the transactions. However, at the end of the day
when the data center is fetching the transactions to build the
Merkle tree, the data center can easily figure out the problem
and inform IoT edge device to push their IoT hash transactions
again by using different EOS and/or Stellar nodes.
Threat 4: In our framework, Ethereum acts as an unbreak-
able seal to provide a long-term integrity ensuring mechanism
for forensic investigations. This is due the fact that, Ethereum
is a huge blockchain network which contains more than 10,000
full nodes. This makes Ethereum very secure against the 51%
attacks since the cost of such an attack is around $400,000 per
hour for now [23]. Thus, changing an old transaction, in other
worlds, rolbacking will be worth $400K × hours depending
on how old the transaction is. To change old transaction, the
attacker must create a new and longer chain starting from
the target block. Ethereum network has 215 TH/s hash rate,
which is very high. To change old data in the Ethereum
network requires calculating this difficulty from scratch for
each succeeding blocks continuously.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a forensics framework that
consists of multiple blockchain networks in two layers. The
purpose of the system is to verify authenticity and integrity of
the data collected from various IoT devices in case of possible
disputes. We collaboratively used multiple blockchains to
create a more secure and tamper-resistance yet affordable
system. For reducing the size of the data, we utilized hashes
as well as Merkle tree to only store hash of hashes at the end
of each day.
We performed cost analysis with the actual prices obtained
from three well-known blockchain networks and analyzed
the security features of the design by considering possible
attack scenarios. The results indicated that our framework
reduces the costs significantly and makes it attractive to be
used for companies. The system can be improved further by
including additional low-cost blockchain platforms as they
become available in the future to increase the resistance against
possible attacks.
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